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THE FUTURE OF SYNTHETIC
SECURITIZATION
A COMMENT ON BELL & DAWSON
CLAIRE A. HILL*
In their article Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Tech-
nology for Credit Transfer,1 Ian Bell and Petrina Dawson manage a
difficult and impressive feat: in an accessible (indeed, downright
readable) account, they explain synthetic securitization, which is
among the most complex and arcane transaction structures in use to-
day.  Bell and Dawson describe the trajectory that led to synthetic se-
curitization.2  The sovereign debt crisis in 1982 led regulators to enact
an international agreement, the Basle Concordat, imposing minimum
capital requirements on banks.3  For every loan as to which they re-
tained the risk of default, banks were required to keep a certain level
of capital.  Keeping capital is expensive; banks therefore wished to
sell some of their loans.  The capital markets were a ready buyer, us-
ing the securitization transaction structure.  The banks shed the risk
of default on the loans they sold, thereby minimizing the amount of
capital they needed to hold.
Meanwhile, banks and other financial institutions became keenly
aware of risks other than the risk of default; they experienced consid-
erable losses during the various financial crises of the 1980s due to
currency risk and basis risk.  Financial institutions thus became moti-
vated to deal more effectively with those risks; derivatives transac-
tions were developed, in which the risks were expressly quantified
and allocated.  The technology of derivative transactions was later
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adapted for use to allocate credit risk.  In credit derivative transac-
tions, one party “buys” from a “protection seller” (effectively, an in-
surer) protection from credit risk.  In a typical structure, the
buyer/insured holds a particular loan, and agrees (a) to pay the
seller/insurer premiums, and (b) that if there is a default, it will con-
vey the loan to the seller/insurer, in exchange for which the
seller/insurer will convey the amount originally owed under the loan
to the buyer/insured.
But derivatives transactions could only be done among banks or
other financial institutions; it is financial institutions that originate
and hold loans and therefore need insurance, and they need insurance
from an entity whose continuing creditworthiness can be assured in
the event payments on the insurance are required.  Assuring the con-
tinuing creditworthiness of what may be a shifting pool of capital
markets investors is difficult and costly.  Synthetic securitization
solves this problem.  Capital markets investors pay money up front to
a special purpose vehicle (SPV).  The SPV carefully safeguards the
investors’ funds; its activities are carefully constrained so that it has
no creditors other than the investors.  Throughout the transaction, the
investors get the premiums paid by the buyer/insured.  The investors’
original investment is held by the SPV, and is available to pay the
buyer/insured if the obligation for which the insurance is being pur-
chased defaults.  If all goes well, the original investment, plus accrued
interest, is returned to the investors at the end of the transaction’s
term.
The foregoing is a truncated summary of Bell and Dawson’s ac-
count of the history of synthetic securitization.  Once Bell and Daw-
son have concluded their history, they make a bold claim: “[T]he syn-
thetic securitization market is the second great leap forward in the
road to a totally disintermediated financial world.”4  They point to the
explosive growth in transaction volume in the few years since the
transactions were first developed.5  And they make a persuasive case
that synthetic securitization is an important financing innovation.6  It
permits specialization in loan origination and servicing, allocation of
risks with great precision, and direct access to the capital markets.
Their article would be enriched if they were to address some po-
tential objections to their claim.  One objection is that the traditional
4. Bell & Dawson, supra note 1, at 561.
5. Id. at 551.
6. Id. at 550–51.
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bundling of loan origination, servicing, and risk-retention has more
viability in certain market segments than Bell and Dawson acknowl-
edge.  Other, likely more important, objections concern Enron.  The
Enron debacle has focused critical scrutiny on many types of complex
financial instruments, and on the accounting rules on which many
such instruments (including securitization instruments) depend.
Regulators might impose barriers or otherwise constrain financial in-
novation of the sort involved in synthetic securitization.
In this regard, many securitization transactions are motivated by
a desire to “beautify” the firm’s balance sheet.7  Beautification is of-
ten accomplished by off-balance sheet treatment.  In Enron, off-
balance sheet treatment was used to deceive—to conceal liabilities.
Off-balance sheet treatment is used in securitization transactions not
to conceal liabilities, but to reflect that liabilities (the risks associated
with the loans) have been transferred to another party.  But there are
necessarily line-drawing issues.  The “buyer” of the loans (or the one
who takes on the credit risk) will want some assurances as to the
quality of the loans from the “seller” of the loans; at a certain point
the assurances are strong enough that the seller hasn’t really shed the
risk.  Why off-balance sheet treatment should matter has long been a
puzzle to academics; that it matters is accepted as a fact on Wall
Street.8  All but the most conservative uses may be hard to defend in
the current climate.9
Moreover, Enron has likely created a climate in which buyers of
synthetic securitization securities will be quite wary of the sellers.
Recall that the sellers are seeking to buy insurance against default on
a loan.  Rather than buying insurance, the sellers could simply sell the
loan.  Why don’t they?  The capital markets investor may reason that
the loan would not withstand the thorough due diligence that the
typical buyer of loans, a financial institution, would conduct; the capi-
tal markets investor would therefore presume the securitization secu-
rity the investor was being offered was not worth the price.  In this
7. I discuss financial statement beautification in Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appear-
ances Might Matter: An Explanation for Dirty Pooling and Some Other Types of Financial Cos-
metics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997).
8. Id. at 142–43.
9. Indeed, a provision in the proposed bankruptcy reform bill that would have provided
more assurance that securitization transactions would be respected in bankruptcy was recently
deleted; the provision had become politically unacceptable because of Enron.  Glenn R. Simp-
son & Susan Pulliam, Congressional Negotiators Drop Measure In Bankruptcy Bill Tied to En-
ron Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2002, at A4.
HILL COMMENT_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:09 PM
566 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:563
climate, sellers of securitization securities likely are not able to rebut
that presumption.10
In sum, Enron has made both regulators and investors wary.  In-
deed, investors are fleeing, not to “quality” as in typical crises, but to
simplicity and transparency.  Both investors and regulators may react
with what is arguably an excess of caution, tarring much financial in-
novation with the Enron brush.
10. This is a classic “lemons problem” (so named after transactions in used cars).  Such
problems were first modeled in the economic literature in George Akerlof, The Market for
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  This year,
Akerlof won a Nobel Prize in economics for this work.
